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Global Information Policymaking
and Domestic Law
FRED H. CATE*
The global information age presents both opportunities and challenges
for U.S. domestic law for two distinct, but related, reasons. First,
information is inherently global; it respects neither geographical nor legal
boundaries. As a result, it is particularly unsusceptible to ad hoc national
regulation. Second, information is at the heart of the U.S. economy. Both
the economic importance of the rapidly growing information services sector
and the central role of information in almost all political and economic
activities, particularly multinational business, necessitate the creation of
consistent, multinational legal and technical standards.
The United States, however, has not consistently recognized that its own
self-interest lies in multinational cooperation and the development of truly
global information-related standards. In fact, U.S. policymakers are
unmistakably schizophrenic; they negotiate multinational responses with
allies and trading partners to some important global information problems,
while expressing hostility to other multinational information law regimes.
Often, the U.S. position changes over time as U.S. interests shift. For
example, U.S. lawmakers delayed for more than a century before according
even the most minimal copyright protection to works created by non-U.S.
authors, and almost another century before bringing U.S. law into basic
compliance with the major multinational copyright order.' As a result of
the delay, U.S. authors suffered at the hands of international pirates and U.S.
efforts to protect its intellectual property interests were severely hampered.
But as little as the United States could afford to be separated from its allies
and trading partners with regard to copyright protection, it can afford even
less to go it alone where the full panoply of information products and
* A.B., Stanford University; J.D., Stanford Law School. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington; Faculty Advisor, Federal Communications Law Journal; and
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1. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
services are involved. The costs of doing so, particularly in the face of
rapidly advancing digital information technologies, are staggering.
This article examines the nature of information in the global
economy-its inherently global characteristics and its importance to business
and political activities. It then explores three episodes in which the United
States has encountered other nations over issues of information policy and
law. The article concludes that information's power, scope, reach, and
importance, both as a vital sector of the U.S. economy and as the essential
underpinning of so many other critical activities, raise the stakes of going
it alone and threaten to impose increasingly higher costs to consumers, to
business, and to the operation of government. Instead, national governments
should recognize that their own self-interest lies in compatible legal regimes,
workable international standards, and global cooperation.
I. INFORMATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The impact of the new, global information age on U.S. domestic law can
hardly be overstated for at least two reasons. These reasons are the global
characteristic of information and the essential nature of information to
multinational business and government activities.
A. The Global Characteristic of Information
First, information is inherently global; it respects no boundaries. Anne
Branscomb, head of the American Bar Association Science and Technology
Section Project on International Information Networks, has written: "[t]he
very existence of information technology is threatening to nation states."2
According to Professor Joseph N. Pelton:
We are not talking about a modest proposition here. Telepower
in its various forms-telecommunications, electronic entertainment,
computer and information services, robotics, artificial intelligence,
and expert systems-is already reshaping the global economy,
internationalizing labor, and shifting jobs in space, time, and
2. Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data
Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REv. 985, 987-88 (1983).
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concept. Some would argue it is rendering the nation state
obsolete.3
Whether in a wire (or optical fiber) or beamed from a satellite or microwave
dish, information-particularly electronic information-is ubiquitous.
Unlike a truckload of steel or a freight train of coal, television and radio
signals,and telephone, facsimile and modem communications are difficult to
pinpoint and almost impossible to block, through either legal or
technological means.'
As a result of its inherently transnational character, information has been
the subject of some of the earliest multinational agreements, treaties, and
organizations. Bilateral postal treaties were concluded as early as 1601
between France and Spain and 1670 between France and England.' As
Professor Jost Delbriick has quipped, the establishment of the Austro-
German Postal Union in 18506 made it possible to send a letter in the
nineteenth century across the dozens of principalities that made up what is
now Germany in less time than it takes the Bundespost to deliver a letter
across Germany today. The Postal Congress of Berne in 1874 created the
General Postal Union which established a multinational postal regime
(administered today by the Universal Postal Union, or UPU) seventy-four
years before the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
opened for signature.7 This global framework is so comprehensive, and the
practical difficulty of separating domestic and international mail so great,
that UPU regulations today set the terms for domestic, as well as
international service.
3. Joseph N. Pelton, The Globalization of Universal Telecommunications Services, ANNUAL
REVIEW OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION STUDIES 141, 143 (1991).
4. Since the digital information flowing in cables or moving through space will be, in
effect, a single, homogenous stream, it will become increasingly impossible to maintain any
of the traditional distinctions between transmissions carrying news, entertainment, financial
data or even personal phone calls. This intermixing of data will make it impossible to pass
laws restricting the transmission of one kind of information without impinging on all the
others.
W. Sparks, Address to the Conference on World Communications. Annenberg School of Communication,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (May 1980), quoted in Branscomb, supra note 2, at 1006.
5. Ludwig Weber, Postal Communications, International Regulation, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 238-39; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [herinafter GATT].
8. Weber, supra note 5, at 241.
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Electronically transmitted information also sparked multinational
agreements almost immediately upon its commercial deployment. The
telegraph was first employed commercially in the early 1840s, and by 1849,
bilateral and multilateral agreements were in place to facilitate and regulate
its transnational use.9  In 1865, Napoleon III called an international
conference in Paris to address technical standards, codes, and tariffs for the
telegraph."0 The twenty countries attending negotiated the first Inter-
national Telegraph Union, which later combined with the Radiotelegraph
Conference to form the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). In
short, by the time the telephone appeared on the scene in 1876, there already
existed an eleven-year-old structure for dealing with multinational electronic
communication.
Today, in addition to the UPU and ITU, information and communication
are the subject of hundreds of regional and international agreements and
organizations, such as the Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (the Berne Convention ("Berne")), the World Intellectual
Property Organization, INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSAT, and
InterSputnik. Along with these provisions for enhancing and regulating the
multinational flow of information have come agreements including
provisions that protect information-related rights, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights," the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 2 the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 3 and the American Convention on
Human Rights. 4
9. Alfons Noll, International Telecommunication Union, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1983); Peter Malanczuk, Telecommunications, International Regulation, 9
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (1986).
10. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 38 (2d ed.
1989).
11. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19 (1948).
12. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 19
(1966).
13. Europ. T.S. No. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
14. 36 Org. Am. States Treaty Service 1, O.A.S. Official Records OEAISER. 4 v/l 23, doc. 21
rev. 2 (1975), San Jos6, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13 (entered into force 1978).
[Vol. 1: 467
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B. Information and Multinational Business
The second reason that the global information age is particularly
important to the U.S. economy and legal structure is that information,
perhaps because of its inherently global characteristics, is increasingly the
subject of, and essential to, all business and governmental activities. This
significance of information was forcefully recognized in the Clinton
Administration's recent National Information Infrastructure Agenda for
Action:
' Information is one of the nation's most critical economic
resources .... By one estimate, two-thirds of U.S. workers are in
information-related jobs, and the rest are in industries that rely
heavily on information. In an era of global markets and global
competition, the technologies to create, manipulate, manage and use
information are of strategic importance to the United States. 5
During the 1980s, for example, U.S. business alone invested one trillion
dollars in information technology. 6 Communications and related industries
are among the fastest growing, most profitable segments of the U.S.
economy, accounting for 9.2 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.17
The information sector is second only to defense in its positive contribution
to the U.S. trade balance. 18 Before the end of the decade, information is
likely to be first.'9
In addition to being the subject of international trade, efficient, rapid
communications are essential to the operations of the government and
national and multinational businesses. Branscomb writes, "Transborder data
15. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
AGENDA FOR ACTION 5 (1993).
16. Howard Gleckman, The Technology Payoff, Bus. WK., June 14, 1993, at 58.
17. Patrick Bloomfield, "New" Economy Beckons Investors, FIN. POST, Mar. 3, 1992, at 18. The
historically important construction industry accounts for only 7.2 percent. Id. See also Branscomb,
supra note 2, at 989; Fred H. Cate, Communications Policy Making, Competition, and the Public
Interest: The New Dialogue, 68 IND. L.J. 665, 665 (1993).
18. Fred H. Cate, The European Broadcasting Directive, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. 7.
19. The figures showing the importance of information to the European economy are similar.
Estimates published in the Financial Times in 1992 indicate that telecommunications alone will account
for six percent of the EC's Gross Domestic Product by the turn of the century and that more than half
of all EC jobs already "depend on information and communication technology." Hilary Clarke,
Resistance in Europe, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1112.
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flow has become indispensable to the very existence of transnational
enterprise and to the currently flourishing global marketplace. . .
Information is the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and business
decisions."2"
Consider, for example, the growing global market for financial services:
banking, securities and commodities trading, letters of credit, currency
conversions, and loan guarantees. Approximately five percent of U.S.
services exports are in financial services;21 as of mid-1992, the United
States held 66.3 percent of the world market for financial services, far ahead
of the United Kingdom with 17 percent and Japan with 5.1 percent.22
What is a global financial system but a "network of information?" 23 The
importance of information is not limited to broadcasters and telephone
companies; it is indeed the "lifeblood" of the global economy.
As a result, both governments and businesses have a vital stake in
workable and consistent technical and regulatory standards and practices
from country to country to facilitate information as a multinational
commodity and service as an essential component of multinational business
activities. Even if it were possible to restrict information to the boundaries
of a single country, it is not profitable or practical to do so.24
II. GLOBAL PRESSURES ON DOMESTIC LAW AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
It is commonplace to observe that, with few exceptions, states participate
in international arrangements when it is in their best interest to do so, or
when those arrangements can be molded to conform with states' perceived
self-interests. When an international agreement or organization no longer
serves a state's interest, either short or long term, that state is likely to seek
to extricate itself or to avoid its obligations under the no longer profitable
arrangement. Exceptions are rare, occuring only where a principle or
commitment to some other, higher norm will at least partially guide a state's
actions, perhaps slowing pursuit of its own interest.
20. Branscomb, supra note 2, at 989.
21. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4 (1992).
22. UK. Financial Services Hold 17 Percent of Market, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at 6.
23. CHARLES GOLDFINGER, LA GtOFINANCE 401 (1986).
24. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA (1993).
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The two features of information identified above-its inherently global
characteristics and its importance as a commodity, a service, and an essential
facilitator of all business activities-have particular relevance for the way
in which the United States has perceived its own self-interest. Historically,
the United States has not consistently acted in concert with its trading
partners with regard to information policy. While the U.S. government has
been an active participant and, in many cases, a leader in intergovernmental
agencies dealing with technical aspects of information and communication
(such as spectrum allocation), it has often resisted participation in
multinational policy-level agreements.
U.S. policymakers remain confused as to where the nation's self-interest
lies, and U.S. information-related laws and policies reflect that confusion.
The inherently global characteristics of information and its role in American
business are magnifying the importance of U.S. participation in global
information policymaking and institutions. Yet these same features are
increasingly perceived as threats to U.S. leadership in the information
economy and heighten U.S. concern over protecting that so-called
dominance. In some important sectors of the global information economy,
the United States is increasingly likely to be found at least negotiating with,
if not actually agreeing with, its allies and trading partners. In others, where
the United States is unable to reconcile its interests within a global
policymaking framework, the government's hostility to that framework is
intense. Branscomb has written, "Indeed, the most recent U.S. policy
analysis [regarding international information regulation] evidences both
myopia and paranoia."2
A. Copyright
For an example of the United States ultimately recognizing the need to
come within the global fold, consider the U.S. position towards international
25. Branscomb, supra note 2, at 987 n.5.
Despite its traditional stance of encouraging worldwide cooperation on information technology
... the United States seems increasingly unready, unwilling, and even unable to lead the
world community into an international system of information exchange that maximizes shared
use of information resources. As the United States sees its leadership position eroded by
strong competitors in the international information marketplace, the pendulum of American
opinion on these policy questions swings in the opposite direction towards information
protectionism, information independence, and even information indifference.
Id. at 986-87.
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copyright protection. For more than a century, the United States resisted
participating in any multinational copyright structure. The nation was, in the
words of David Nimmer, an "island, its jurisprudence having evolved in
isolation from developments elsewhere. 26 In fact, until 1891, copying a
non-U.S. work was not even a crime in the United States.27 Then, in 1952,
the United States joined the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC),28
while refusing to participate in the older, more powerful and encompassing
1881 Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
In 1988 Congress finally enacted those basic changes necessary for the
United States to accede to the Berne Convention and the United States
joined seventy-nine other countries which were signatories of that
Convention.29  While U.S. domestic copyright law is still out of
compliance with Berne on the duration of copyright protection and provides
only the most limited protection of authors' rights,30 the country now at
least can join the rest of the world at the intellectual property table.
Much of the impetus for this move came from U.S. intellectual property
owners who desired the broad multinational protection afforded by
membership in Berne. Losses to U.S. copyright holders by piracy abroad
were estimated by the U.S. International Trade Commission to be $7.2
billion in 1988, up from $1.5 billion only four years earlier. 3 The twenty-
four countries that had ratified Berne but not the UCC and had no bilateral
copyright agreements with the United States were under no legal obligation
to protect the rights of U.S. copyright holders. Moreover, U.S. efforts to
encourage compliance with international copyright agreements by countries
such as Thailand, that provided safe havens to copyright pirates, were
hindered by the United States' own refusal to join Berne. In 1988 the U.S.
Trade Representative testified before Congress, "it is often hard to convince
other countries to provide strong copyright protection when we do not
26. David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An International Copyright
Proposal for the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 211 (1992).
27. International Copyright Act of 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891 saw passage of the
International Copyright Act of 1891, commonly known as the Chace Act).
28. 6 U.S.T. 2731 (1952), revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
29. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 101).
30. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 211.
31. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (Feb. 1988).
[Vol. 1: 467
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belong to the premier international treaty in the area of copyright."32 In
short, if the interests of U.S. creative industries were to be protected,
adherence to the global copyright regime reflected in the Berne Convention
was essential.
B. Broadcast Regulation
For a recent example of intense U.S. hostility to a multinational
informational order that is perceived as threatening U.S. participation in
global information markets, consider the U.S. response to the European
Commission's EC Council Directive Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities,33 adopted by the EC Council of Ministers34 on
October 3, 1989. Under the Directive, in addition to notable provisions
protecting minors, regulating advertising and sponsorship, providing for a
right of reply, and prohibiting the airing of harmful programming (such as
cigarette advertisements), each of the twelve Member States of the EC must
ensure that "where practicable and by appropriate means," a majority of
broadcast transmission time, excluding time occupied by news, sports,
games, advertising and teletext, is reserved for "European works. 35
32. H.R. Rep. No. 4262, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (letter of U.S. Trade Representative
Clayton Yeutter included in statement of Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier).
33. Council Directive 32, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Broadcasting Directive].
34. The Council is composed of the ministers from each of the EC's 12 Member States: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.
35. Broadcasting Directive, supra note 33, art. 4. "European works" are defined to include
programming originating from Member States or other European states which are party to the
Convention, which also meet one of three conditions: (i) they are made by producers "established" in
Member States; (2) the production of the works is supervised and actually controlled by producers
established in Member States; or (3) a majority of financing for each production is supplied by EC co-
producers and the co-production is not controlled by any producer established outside of the EC. Id. at
art. 6.
"European works" may also include programming originating from European states that are neither
Member States nor adherents to the Convention, but is produced by producers established in Member
States or by producers in European countries which will agree to abide by the Treaty of Rome, provided
that the production must be "mainly made" with authors and workers residing in European countries.
Id.
Programming that meets none of the definitions above can still be considered a European work "to
an extent corresponding to the production of the contribution of European co-producers to the total
production costs," provided that the production is made "mainly" with authors and works residing in
European countries. Id.
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The firestorm of protest touched off in the United States by this action
made the country's response only five years earlier to the New World
Information Order, which ultimately led to the United States' withdrawal
from UNESCO, look mild.36 Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America, argued that the European restriction "hurls a lance
right at the heart of the U.S. industry's future. ' 3  Richard Frank, President
of Walt Disney Studios, predicted that the broadcasting Directive marks the
beginning of a descent "into a new dark age of unending economic
warfare. 3
8
The U.S. government responded to the European broadcasting Directive
with similar agitation. On October 23, 1989, the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives unanimously approved a resolution attacking the Directive as
"restrictive and discriminatory" and calling on the Bush Administration to
take "all appropriate and feasible action" to protect U.S. access to European
broadcasting markets.39 Bush Administration Trade Representative Carla
36. I have written elsewhere that the U.S. response to the Directive is not unlike the response to
the New World Information Order. See Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the International "Free
Flow" ofInformation, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1990). When UNESCO's International Commission for
the Study of Communications Problems released its 1980 report, Many Voices, One World, calling for
greater balance in news reporting and communications resources between the developed and developing
worlds, reaction to the proposals throughout the United States was uniformly hostile, often characterizing
the issue as being an attempt by "undemocratic governments" to censor the press. INT'L COMM'N FOR
THE STUDY OF COM. PROBS., MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980). In fact, more than half of the 141
pieces that The New York Times ran between 1976 and 1983 dealing with the debate in UNESCO were
editorials and columns criticizing the "quiet moves" being made by UNESCO to "curb freedom of the
press." In an editorial entitled "UNESCO as Censor," the Times referred to UNESCO as "the thought-
controllers." Donna C. Wood, Perspectives on a New World Information Order 33 (1985) (unpublished
A.B. thesis, Stanford University). When the Soviet Union in the 1974 UNESCO General Conference
introduced a "draft declaration on fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media in
strengthening peace and international understanding and in combatting war, racism and apartheid," the
United States delegation walked out of the Conference. Id. at 40. The text of the draft declaration was
never officially published. In 1976, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger threatened that the United
States would withdraw from UNESCO if the Mass Media Declaration was adopted. Howard Frederick,
UNESCO's Mass Media Declaration, Ten Years of Accomplishment?, INTERMEDIA, July-Sept. 1987, at
76. The United States withdrew from UNESCO in December 1984.
37. Jack Valenti, The European Community Makes Ominous Sounds About Broadcast Quotas,
remarks to the U.S. State Department Advisory Commission on International Communications and
Information Policy, Washington, D.C., at 3 (July 17, 1989).
38. Television Broadcasting and the European Community: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
50 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Richard Frank).
39. House Approves Resolution Urging US. Action to Protest Programming Directive, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1384 (Oct. 25, 1989); see H. Res. 257, quoted in Administration Urged to "Protect"
US. Access to EC Broadcasting Market, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1337 (Oct. 18, 1989).
476
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Hills issued a statement "deplor[ing]" the EC's decision as "blatantly
protectionist and unjustifiable," and referring to the European content
provision as "an enemy of free trade."'  The administration initiated
multilateral action under the GATT on December 1, 1989, by entering into
the consultative process required under GATT prior to filing a complaint."
The United States also threatened unilateral action against the EC under
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988.42 Trade
Representative Hills took the first step toward beginning a Section 301
investigation on April 26, 1991, when she placed the EC on a Section 301
40. Congress Lashes Out at European TV Content Restrictions, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 13, 1989, at
1, 2; H.Res. 257, supra note 39, at 1337.
41. U.S. Enters Into GA T' Consultations with EC Over Broadcasting Directive, U.S. Department
of State memorandum. According to Julius Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, the Administration
believes that the Directive violates Article I of GATT, dealing with most-favored-nation status, by
according preferential treatment to broadcast programming from "other non-EC members of the Council
of Europe." Hearings, supra note 38, at 9 (statement of Julius Katz). Moreover, the Directive violates
Article III's national treatment provision, "which requires GATT contracting parties to extend to the
products of other contracting parties treatment 'no less favorable' than that accorded to like products
of national origin." Id. at 11, quoting GATT, supra note 7, art. III.
Action under the GATT could take years and the GATT has no independent enforcement authority.
GATT recommendations for enforcement must be accepted unanimously by the membership; any
European country could therefore veto any proposed enforcement. See Brian L. Ross, "I Love Lucy, "
But the European Community Doesn't: Apparent Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast
Market, 16 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 529, 543-44 (1990). Moreover, action concerning the broadcasting
Directive under GATT is likely to be on the Administration's back burner at present because of growing
controversy between the United States and the EC over other GATT matters, particularly provisions
governing agricultural services. See generally GA T' and the Uruguay Round, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Nov. 19, 1990, at 277. Deputy Trade Representative Katz announced on October 22, 1990, that
broadcasting was likely to be excluded from the talks.
42. U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041, amended
by Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3002, and Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1990)). See generally Steven R. Phillips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets?, 22 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 491 (1989).
Under Section 301, action by the President or the U.S. Trade Representative is required whenever
the Trade Representative determines that "the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied;" or when "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country ... violates, or is inconsistent
with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
... is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce." Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(l) (1990)); see generally Ross, supra note 41, at 546 (citation omitted).
If the Trade Representative makes such a determination, he or she is required to take all
"appropriate and feasible action ... to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice," including,
but not limited to, "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement
concessions.., impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country .. .enter into binding
agreements with such foreign country." Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301(a)(l)(B)(ii), 1301(c)(1) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 l(a)(l)(B)(ii), 241 l(c)(I) (1990)).
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"priority watch list" because of the broadcasting Directive.43 If the EC is
subsequently designated a "priority foreign country," the Trade Represen-
tative then has thirty days to begin formal negotiations designed to remedy
the trade grievance, and six months to determine whether retaliatory action
is necessary. In placing the EC on the so-called "watch list"-a largely
symbolic measure since the designation invokes no statutory authority or
time limits-the Trade Representative noted that the EC had met some, but
not all, of the criteria for priority designation. EC officials responded by
largely ignoring the designation, saying that the move was "destined for
U.S. domestic competition."
The U.S. response to the EC broadcasting Directive clearly reflects the
importance to the U.S. economy of information-related industries and the
importance to those industries of foreign markets. Copyrighted
programming of all forms accounted in 1989 for over $173 billion in
revenues and over $22 billion in exports.45 Compared with imports,
exports of U.S. television programming, films, and music generated a trade
surplus of $8 billion during 1991." In short, any multinational regime that
threatens to limit the United States' ability to export programming poses a
serious trade issue. Moreover, and perhaps more important, any
multinational regime from which the United States is excluded-and
particularly a regime, such as the EC, whose members are closely involved
with other associations, such as NATO, in which the United States does
share an interest-is unlikely to be received warmly by the United States.47
James Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security, Assistance,
Science and Technology during the Reagan Administration, testified in 1982
about the United States' concern over an earlier multinational regime
43. USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand Most Egregious Violators Under Section 301,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (May 1, 1991).
44. Quoted in EC Officials Say USTR Section 301 Action "Destined for U.S. Domestic
Consumption," 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 646 (May 1, 1991).
45. Draft Final Text of the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Way and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
102 (1922) [hereinafter Uruguay Round] (statement of Eric H. Smith).
46. Noreene Janus, Hollywood Meets the NAFTA, Bus. MEXICO, May 1992, at 1:
47. The United States actually suggested that U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher be
invited to participate in EC Commission deliberations about the broadcast Directive. "That's out of the
question," responded Corrado Pirzio-Birdi, acting head of the EC Commission delegation in Washington.
"Do you think the U.S. Congress would ever give us a seat at the table in working out U.S. legislation?
I mean, you must be kidding." US. Lobbying on Broadcasting Measure "Counterproductive, " EC
Official Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1420, 1421 (Nov. 1, 1989) (quoting Corrado Pirzio-Birdi).
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threatening U.S. information interests: the MacBride Commission's report
on the New World Information Order. "For the United States," Secretary
Buckley said, "communications and information technologies represent a
leading edge of U.S. strength. Policy and practice in international
communications and information activities must actively enhance the overall
well-being of the United States, the lives of its people, and its system of
government.
4
The EC Directive is seen by critics as posing a similar threat. Exports
of U.S. television programming and films to European countries constitute
approximately $1.8 billion in revenues to the U.S. television and film
industries.49 Moreover, it is the European resale market for television
movies that turns many losers into big money-makers.50  Secretary
Buckley's lament with regard to the potential economic impact of the New
World Information Order that other countries "wish to gain a foothold in an
area which represents the wave of the future," is certainly applicable to the
EC broadcast Directive.
As a result, although U.S. information businesses are doing a booming
business in Europe5 '-largely aided by the unified markets and more
uniform standards-the U.S. government is on record as unalterably opposed
to the quota provisions of the Directive.52 The U.S. government has also
48. James Buckley, International Communications and Information Objectives, DEP'T STATE
BULL., vol. 82, no. 2063, at 78 (Jun. 1982).
49. Hearings, supra note 38, at 41 (statement of Jack Valenti).
50. Timothy Harper, Europe's Changing Channels, AMERICAN WAY, Jan. 15, 1990, at 42, 46.
5I. See generally Brits Bank on Rerun Bonanza with US. Help, VARIETY, Sept. 28, 1992, at 27;
Bill Carter, US. Cable Unspools Its Wires Across the Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at C6; Jennifer
Clark, WO Intl. Puts 600 Hours on Italian Syndie Market, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 3, 1992, at 18; Steve
Clark, Yank Sitcoms Boost Ratings, VARIETY, Nov. 2, 1992, at 82; Adam Dawtrey, 20th TV Taps
Schwable as Euro Co-Prod n Veepee, DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 11, 1992, at 62; Don Groves, Par Seeks
to Retain Stake in Zenith Prods., VARIETY, Aug. 31, 1992, at 40; Keith Keller, FilmNet Signs Exclusive
Deal with Carolco, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 20, 1992, at 11; Rebecca Lieb, Pubcasters are Reeling;
Private Webs Appealing, VARIETY, Sept. 14, 1992, at 37; Jennifer Pendleton, Gaylord, Group W to
Launch Country Channel in Europe, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 13, 1992, at 11; Jennifer Pendleton, U.S.
Cablers Plugging into Europe, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 15, 1992, at I; Cecilia Stratimirovich, America the
Beautiful?, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 19, 1992, at 93; Michael Williams, Pay-Per-View Peeks Into View,
VARIETY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 33.
52. I, along with other observers, have questioned why the U.S. response to the broadcasting
Directive has been so vociferous. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Continuing Battle Over the EC
Broadcasting Directive, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC.; Fred H. Cate, The European Broadcasting
Directive, supra note 18. Current restrictions in the United Kingdom effectively restrict U.S. programs
to 14 percent of broadcast television. Philip Revzin, The Battle for Europe's TV Future, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1989, at B 1, B4. Elsewhere in Europe, the share of non-European broadcast programming is
approximately 23 percent. BRIAN WENHAM, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICALITIES (Working Papers of the
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shown its willingness, even enthusiasm, for using trade sanctions as a way
of dealing with information-related disputes. In addition to Section 301, 53
multinational commerce in information and communications products and
services is subject to a growing array of domestic trade laws. The
inherently global qualities of information and its significance for business
has arguably not made the United States more pliable, but rather increased
its concerns about, and hardened its opposition to, perceived limits on U.S.
information products and services.
III. NEW PRESSURES ON UNITED STATES INFORMATION LAW AND
POLICY: DATA PROTECTION
The inherently global characteristics of information and its importance
to U.S. business interests have forced substantial change in U.S. domestic
law in the case of copyright. In the case of broadcasting regulation,
Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on European Broadcasting 1, 1989). A virtual explosion in European
broadcasting outlets is expected to increase available air time in EC countries from 250,000 per year to
more than 400,000 per year within five years. Harper, supra note 50, at 44. "That means that from the
current 80,000 hours a year, foreign broadcasters can look forward to up to 200,000 hours, an increase
of 150 percent." Id. Moreover, under the current country-by-country quota system, the penalties for
non-compliance have proved severe in some countries. During the summer of 1989, the French Conseil
sup~rieur de 'audiovisuel announced it would fine television stations $10,000 for every hour of
programming that exceeded French national broadcasting quotas. They promptly imposed a $6 million
fine against the station, La Cinq, for failing to adhere to existing national quotas limiting programming
of non-French origin. Hearings, supra note 38, at 54 (statement of Richard Frank).
53. The Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1371, 102 Stat. 1217
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988)), explicitly applies the provisions of U.S. trade laws, including
Section 301, to agreements involving telecommunications products and services.
The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (extended by The Export
Administration Authorization for Fiscal Year 1993-94, Pub. L. No. 103-10, 107 Stat. 40 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1991)), authorizes export controls "(1) [t]o protect the domestic economy from the
excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand; (2)
[t]o further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its international
responsibilities; and (3) [t]o exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security of the United States." Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R.
§§ 768, 770.1(a) (1993). The range of "commodities" covered, for example, includes "technical data."
15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993).
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
90 Stat. 729 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988)), implemented through the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1993), requires a license from the State Department's Office of
Munitions Control for the export or import of communications products, including technical data, which
military applications are likely to require. See generally Fred H. Cate, United States Laws Regulating
International Telecommunications Products and Services, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE
HANDBOOK (1994).
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however, those twin characteristics have combined to strengthen U.S.
obduracy. Today, however, a new set of global information issues threatens
traditional U.S. jurisprudence and markets, namely the regulation of
automated data processing and the protection of personal privacy. It
remains to be seen how the Clinton Administration will respond.
While European countries have afforded significant, detailed, practical
protection to individual privacy rights, particularly in the context of
electronically stored and processed information, the United States affords
virtually none. For example, Austria, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom have broad statutes that
provide a general set of privacy rights applicable to both public and private
sectors. 4 Soon, under the European Commission's amended proposal for
a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,5
all European countries will be required to enact laws protecting personal
privacy and prohibiting the transmission of personal information to countries
perceived as ignoring privacy concerns, for example, the United States. 6
Under the still-pending Directive, every EC member state would have
to enact laws ensuring, among other things, that personal data-defined
broadly by the Directive as "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person"' 7-- must be accurate, relevant, not excessive
and used only for the legitimate purposes for which it was collected. 8
Personal data may be processed (which is defined by the Directive as any
operation performed upon the data, whether or not automated9) only with
the consent of the data subject.' The collection and processing of data
revealing "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs,
philosophical or ethical persuasion... [or] concerning health or sexual life"
54. See generally DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES
(1989).
55. Com(92)422 Final SYN 287 (Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Data Processing Directive].
56. Id. art. 26 ("Member States shall provide that the transfer, whether temporary or permanent,
to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or which have been collected with
a view to processing may take place only if the third country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection"). See generally Fred H. Cate, The EC Data Protection Directive and U.S. Business and Law,
A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. (forthcoming 1994).
57. Data Processing Directive, supra note 55, art. 2(a).
58. Id. art. 6.
59. Id. art. 2(b).
60. Id. art. 7(a).
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is severely restricted."' The data subject must be informed and provided
with certain mandatory disclosures if data is to be collected, processed
and/or distributed to a third party,62 and he or she must have access to the
data, the opportunity to object to its collection, processing and/or disclosure,
and the opportunity to correct any factual errors.63
The United States and many other countries have no comparable system
of data protection. Although the United States Supreme Court claimed to
recognize a constitutional interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" in Whalen v. Roe,' no Court decision has ever reversed a
legislative or administrative action based on that supposed right. Moreover,
such a constitutional right-even if vindicated by a court-would apply only
against governmental action. Federal statutes addressing private actions
touching on personal privacy, although numerous, offer little, if any,
effective protection to individuals.65
As a result, American businesses with interests in personal data
collected, stored or processed in Europe, and particularly American
businesses with operations in Europe, fear that they will be unable to move
that data legally to the United States, even if they own it. Privacy scholar
David Flaherty writes:
The European data protectors view the current situation as an
excellent opportunity to put pressure on Canada and the United
States for improved data protection. They anticipate blocking the
movement of personal data from European branches of multi-
nationals to Canadian or American branches, because equivalent
data protection does not exist. For various reasons, including
nationalistic ones, they are very serious about this ....
61. Id. art. 8.
62. Id. arts. 10-12.
63. Id. arts. 13-15.
64. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
65. See, e.g., The Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988); The Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. 1992); The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b) (1988); The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988); The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r
(1988 & Supp. 1992); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2232,
2510-20, 2701-09, 3117, 3121-26 (1988 & Supp. 1992); The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (1988); The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992); The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§
2001-09 (1988).
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The American private sector, accustomed as it is to no government
regulation for data protection, is especially exercised about the
potential impact of the draft Directive on the data handling activities
of American-controlled multinationals and has made predictable
approaches for protection to the Department of State and the Office
of the International Trade Representative."
U.S. businesses have good reason to be worried. Already, France,
acting under French domestic law,67 has prohibited the French subsidiary
of an Italian parent company from transferring data to Italy because Italy did
not have an omnibus data protection law.6" The French Commission
nationale de l'informatique et des libert6s has required that identifying
information be removed from patient records before they could be
transferred to Belgium,69 Switzerland and the United States.70 Similarly,
the first prohibition on transnational data transfer by the British Data
Protection Registrar under national law7 forbade a proposed sale of a
British mailing list to a United States direct mail organization.72
The threat to U.S. business is quite real and is only exacerbated by the
pending EC data Directive's provision requiring European states to enact
laws forbidding the transfer of personal data to countries without adequate
legal data protection.73
66. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: A REPORT TO THE CANADIAN
RADIO-TELEVISION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 72-73 (1992).
67. Loi No 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative A l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert6s [Law
No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, concerning data processing, records and freedom], Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] du 7 janvier (rectificatif au J.O. du 25 janvier).
68. Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational
Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S162 (1992) (citing D61iib6ration No. 89-78 du I 1 juillet
1989 reprinted in Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libert6s [C.N.I.L.], l0e Rapport 32-34
(1989)).
69. Id. (citing D&libgration No. 89-98 du 26 sept. 1989 reprinted in C.N.I.L., 10e Rapport
d'activit6 35-37 (1990)).
70. Id. at S163 (citing interview with Ariane Mole, Attach6e Relations internationales, Direction
juridique de la Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libert6s, in Paris, France (June 6, 1991)).
71. U.K. Data Protection Act of 1984, reprinted in ADRIANA C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLOW
OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 365-95 (1990).
72. Reidenberg, supra note 68, at S163 (citing OFFICE OF THE DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR,
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 33-34 (1990)).
73. Data Processing Directive, supra note 55, art. 26.
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This situation, as suggested by the French action against Italy, Belgium,
and Switzerland, is further complicated for multinational companies by the
diversity of national regulatory structures in place for protecting personal
privacy. For U.S. companies such as Citicorp, the nation's largest bank and
operator of the Citicorp Global Information Network in ninety-three
countries,74 the variety of legal standards with which the network must
comply threatens the existence of the network and its ability to offer
services such as automated currency conversion. A uniform, multinational
standard would be of obvious value; the absence of such a standard will
stymie innovative activities by multinational companies.
What impact on U.S. domestic law might be expected from the certain
passage of the EC data protection Directive and the considerable need for
more uniform legal privacy standards? Will the Congress enact, and the
President sign, legislation creating protection for personal data more in line
with the Directive? Probably not, or at least not as a result, directly or
indirectly, of the Directive and other international pressure. On the other
hand, will there be political artillery fire and retaliatory trade sanctions
against the EC for restricting transborder data flows? There is no UNESCO
involved in this situation that the United States can pull out of, as it did
when developing countries threatened to restrict news flows in the 1970s
and 1980s. Nevertheless, last year's Clinton Administration response to the
EC equipment directives makes the possibility of some tit-for-tat response
not altogether unlikely.7"
74. Thomas Hoffman, Citicorp Reaps Net Benefits, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 6.
75. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor announced on February 1, 1993, that the
government would bar European companies from bidding on federal utility and service contracts
beginning March 22, 1993, in retaliation for provisions in EC directives permitting European state-run
enterprises in the telecommunications, electricity generation, water, and mass transportation sectors, to
favor European manufacturers. Keith Bradsher, US. Fights a European Trade Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1993, at D6; John M. Broder and Joel Havemann, US. Puts New Barriers on European Business, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at Al. On April 21, 1993, Trade Representative Kantor announced an agreement
with Sir Leon Brittan, EC Commissioner for External Affairs, covering all but the telecommunications
sectors, but promised $25 million in trade sanctions against the EC unless the dispute over
telecommunications equipment procurement is resolved. Last-minute Deal Cools Trade Dispute With
EC, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 22, 1993, at NI; Ana Puga, US. to Slap EC With Sanctions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
22, 1993, at 45. Congress' favorable attitude toward trade sanctions as a negotiating tool was signalled
by Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Chair of the House Commerce subcommittee on
telecommunications and finance, who endorsed the Trade Representative's decision to go ahead with
sanctions: "By imposing sanctions, the United States is leveling the negotiating field." Peter Behr, US.,
Europe Reach Partial Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1993, at BI I.
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The most likely scenario is repetition of a now-common combination of
three responses. First, the U.S. government will unleash some harsh
political rhetoric. Second, under cover of that rhetoric, U.S. factions will
make a great effort to get along. That effort will probably include U.S.
business and, to a lesser degree, government, seeking to diplomatically knit
together what little sectoral data protection law does exist in the United
States into the "adequate" level of protection called for under the data
processing Directive.76 It also probably will include quiet efforts by U.S.
businesses in Europe to offer at least token cooperation with European
government regulators (for example, by reducing the amount of personal
data collected and shipped to the United States). Third, EC enforcement of
the restrictive provisions will be lax at best. EC officials, like their U.S.
counterparts, will try to get along.
This scenario, of course, poorly serves both the purposes of data
protection law and the interests of U.S. business in more uniform, or at least
compatible, national data protection regimes. Therefore, as long as national
interest in data protection elsewhere keeps up, U.S. businesses may lead, or
at least encourage, a longer term effort to work out some international
standard for a basic level of data protection.
IV. THE VIEW FORWARD
So what? Other than some innocuous predictions about how the EC and
the United States will muddle through yet another trade-based confrontation,
what more can an examination of these three episodes of multinational
information policymaking offer?
It provides at least one lesson of more transcendent significance. The
progression from copyright to broadcasting to data protection marks a
technological evolution that poses new and infinitely greater challenges to
global and national policymaking. Precisely because of the twin
characteristics of information-it is inherently global and it is increasingly
essential to global business activities-U.S. hesitancy to embrace a more
international order in the face of advancing technology will pose
increasingly higher costs for the government, businesses and economy of the
United States. It took U.S. lawmakers more than a century to accord even
76. For an excellent analysis of the likelihood of doing so, see Reidenberg, supra note 68, at
S167-70.
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the most minimal protection to works created by non-U.S. authors. It then
took nearly another century before the United States brought its law even
remotely into compliance with the major multinational copyright order. As
a result of the delay, U.S. works were pirated for many years (in many cases
legally) and U.S. efforts to protect its intellectual property interests were
severely hampered.
Those costs, however, will pale by comparison if the United States is
similarly myopic and slow to address the copyright issues posed by digital
technology, massive data bases, high speed data transmission, and
undetectable visual and auditory image manipulation. Paul Goldstein, Stella
W. and Ira S. Lillick Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, has written
only somewhat facetiously about a "celestial jukebox." 7 Rather than own
individual phonorecords, compact discs, cassette tapes, video cassettes, or
even computer software, future generations would simply dial up their
desired programming from a digital master database. The programming
would then be delivered by satellite or optical fiber. As a result, rather than
the high up-front cost and ecologically unsound practice of buying
individual copies of media, each user would pay a far smaller per use fee
to cover the operation of the master database and to pay the creators of the
requested programming.
Professor Goldstein's fanciful idea is in many ways today near reality,
and our legal structures for recognizing and compensating authors and
producers are light years behind. Currently, U.S. negotiators are arguing
with their European counterparts about whether to apply "national treatment"
or "reciprocity" in the stalled Trade-Related Intellectual Property in Services
talks.78 Great. By the time they work that one out, the basic practice that
posed the issue--distinguishing among the nationality of creators in the
payment of royalties-will be moot.
The same is true for broadcasting. For more than thirty years, the
world's population-at least for those few who watch television-has
received broadcast television through three incompatible standards. The
1953 NTSC (National Television Standards Committee) standard for color
77. Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the Information Age, STAN. LAW., Fall 1991, at 4, 8.
78. See, e.g., Uruguay Round, supra note 45, at 104 (statement of Eric H. Smith); International
Developments Discussed at Conference, 2 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 20,703 (Oct. 29-30, 1992) (quoting
U.S. Registrar of Copyrights Ralph Oman: "We may be seeing the beginning of the end of Berne as an
effective International Treaty.").
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television in the United States is incompatible with both the PAL (Phase
Alteration Lines) standard used in fifty-eight countries, including most of
Western Europe, and SECAM (Sequential Color with Memory), used in
France, the Commonwealth of Independent States and twenty-one other
countries, including most of Central Europe. As a result, programming and
equipment produced in the United States are incompatible with European
programming equipment and vice versa.
Now with high definition television ("HDTV") a technological reality,
national governments are pursuing conflicting HDTV systems. We once
again face the prospect of three different standards-a U.S. standard, a
European standard and a Japanese standard--each incompatible with the
other.79
The United States can ill afford to remain a "copyright island."
Although its internal market is large, the country can afford even less to
shut itself off from European, Japanese, and other suppliers and purchasers
of broadcast equipment, services and programming. But the real danger for
the United States is that it may become an "information island," isolated
from the rest of the world in the very commodity that is essential to its
economy. U.S. lawmakers and policymakers face an urgent challenge to
recognize that there is something different about information. Its power,
scope, reach, and importance, as both a vital sector of the United States
economy and as the essential underpinning of so many other critical sectors,
raise the stakes of going it alone. The long-term price of information-
related laws that are incompatible with those of other nations and of
stonewalling or ignoring multinational information agreements and
organizations exceeds any short-term benefits resulting from such policies.
The failure to reach real solutions speedily-to do more than try to get
along under a veneer of rhetoric-will impose increasingly higher costs to
consumers, to business and to the operation of government. Individual
countries, like the United States, must recognize that, because of the global
characteristic of information and its centrality to the modem economy, their
own self-interest lies in compatible legal regimes, workable international
standards, and global cooperation.
79. Presidents of Sony, Thompson and Zenith Disagree on Approaches to HDTV, COMM. DAILY,
July 1, 1991, at 2; Randall M. Sukow, Worldwide Digital, High-Definition Television Transition Plans
Outlined in Montreux, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1991, at 52.
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